



UNITED NATIONS
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

Inclusive and Sustainable Industrial Development Working Paper Series
WP 1 | 2019

MIGRATION PLANS AND DECISION-MAKING AMONG REFUGEES, IDPs AND HOST COMMUNITIES IN PERI-URBAN ERBIL, IRAQ: THE EFFECT OF A UNIDO INTERVENTION

DEPARTMENT OF POLICY, RESEARCH AND STATISTICS

WORKING PAPER 1/2019

**Migration plans and decision-making among refugees,
IDPs and host communities in peri-urban Erbil, Iraq:
The effect of a UNIDO intervention**

Karen Jacobsen
Tufts University

Charles Simpson
Tufts University

Noriko Takahashi
UNIDO



UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

Vienna, 2019

Acknowledgements

This research was conducted to follow up on two UNIDO projects that aimed to generate employment and improve the food security of Syrian refugees, internally displaced persons and host community members in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. We would like to express our gratitude to the Kurdistan Regional Government for their support and to the Governments of Austria and Japan for the generous funding of these projects.

We thank the Erbil-based research team consisting of the Iraqi Kurdistan NGOs Network (IKNN) together with Paul Miranda, Jovita Viray Culaton and Mahmood Nazwad Hassan Khoshnaw.

Special thanks also go to Nicolas Schmidt for assisting in the editing of the paper and Niki Rodousakis for final editing.

The designations employed, descriptions and classifications of countries, and the presentation of the material in this report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries, or its economic system or degree of development. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretariat of the UNIDO. The responsibility for opinions expressed rests solely with the authors, and publication does not constitute an endorsement by UNIDO. Although great care has been taken to maintain the accuracy of information herein, neither UNIDO nor its member States assume any responsibility for consequences which may arise from the use of the material. Terms such as “developed”, “industrialized” and “developing” are intended for statistical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment. Any indication of, or reference to, a country, institution or other legal entity does not constitute an endorsement. Information contained herein may be freely quoted or reprinted but acknowledgement is requested. This report has been produced without formal United Nations editing.

Table of Contents

Abstract	v
Introduction	1
1 Displacement and the KRI's economy	3
2 Research questions	4
2.1 Methods	4
2.2 Survey	4
2.3 Qualitative research	5
3 Findings: Migration from Erbil: Hosts, refugees and IDPs	5
3.1 Plans for migration	6
3.2 Where did those who left want to actually go?	7
3.3 Why people do and do not migrate: drivers, attractors and inhibitors of migration	9
3.4 Migration and industry development programmes like UNIDO's	16
4 Conclusion	20
References	22
Annex 1 - Methods	23
Annex 2 - UNIDO programmes	28

List of Figures

Figure 1	Main arrival states	2
Figure 2	Do you or anyone in your family plan to leave Kurdistan in the next six months? ..	7
Figure 3	Where do they plan to go?.....	8
Figure 4	If you were to migrate sometime in the future, what factors would cause you to move?	10
Figure 5	What would be the most useful thing you could do to further improve your family's living situation? (Number of respondents).....	17
Figure 6	Do you or anyone in your family plan to leave Kurdistan in the next six months? ..	18
Figure 7	Are you working now or in the past week?	19
Figure 8	Compared with one year ago, is family's income better, worse or same?	19
Figure 9	Are you paid daily or monthly? (currently employed)	20

List of Tables

Figure 1	Main arrival states	2
Table 2	Attractors, drivers and inhibitors of migration	11
Table 3	Economic indicators and migration	13
Table 4	Contact with people in other countries	15
Table 5	Q31 Why do you not plan to move?.....	16
Table 6	Indicators of livelihood improvement	19

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the UNIDO programmes in Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), based on the migration intentions of displaced persons (Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs) and the plans of host community members living in and around Erbil. Drawing on surveys and qualitative research conducted in Erbil in 2018, we document the factors that play a role in migration from Erbil as reported by respondents from members of the host community and displaced persons and contemplate whether industry development programmes like UNIDO's could influence migration outcomes. The study was conducted by independent researchers as part of follow-up assessments on the impact of UNIDO's project on promoting self-reliance of host community members and displaced persons in a peri-urban and refugee camp context.¹

¹ In addition to a formal self-evaluation (Final Project Self-Evaluation 2018), UNIDO commissioned a research study to analyse the impact of the project both in terms of strengthening the resilience ("self-reliance") of programme recipients and whether the project may have influenced their migration plans and intentions. The research study was carried out towards the end of the project. This was sufficient time for the project to have had some short-term impact, and the survey can also serve as a baseline to assess the longer-term impact of the intervention.

Introduction

One of the key policy objectives of governments, donors and aid agencies today is to better understand migration patterns and trends, the characteristics of migrants, as well as the drivers and impact of migration to develop evidence-based migration policies.² The so-called European “migration crisis” began in 2015 and peaked in 2016 (Figure 1).³ With human mobility reaching unprecedented levels, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants on 19 September 2016. The Declaration calls for two compacts: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (adopted in December 2018 in Morocco), and the Global Compact on Refugees (affirmed by the member states of the UN General Assembly on 17 December 2018). Multiple discussions on migration and forced displacement at the global level highlight the need for development actors to assess their interventions in this field.

One major policy question is whether development or humanitarian programmes that promote self-reliance (i.e. support individuals’ economic situation and livelihoods) of persons affected by protracted conflict and displacement influence their migration intentions. Some observers assert that economic “stabilization” policies could support the host communities and influence the migration plans of potential migrants. The underlying idea is that when individuals who are displaced or affected by conflict become economically self-sustaining *in situ*—whether in their land of origin or in countries of asylum—they will be less of a burden on the receiving country and change their migration prospects.

However, how economic development in sending regions affects out-migration is by no means clear. Some theories suggest that economic development may actually increase out-migration because incomes and resources increase, thus making the cost of migration more affordable. Other theories suggest that migration is only partially driven by lack of economic opportunities and that networks and anchor communities in receiving countries are more powerful drivers of migration, which economic development might not be able to counter. Regardless, the rationale behind the assumption that economic support could reduce out-migration is widespread, and policies to promote economic stabilization are being pursued by a range of donors as well as humanitarian and development actors.


² The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, <http://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.231/3>

³ In 2015 over 1.2 million first-time asylum applications were made in the EU, more than double the number in 2014. In 2016, the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean dropped to 364,000, and that figure dropped again in 2017, with fewer than half as many migrants reaching Europe by sea. According to the IOM, the UN Migration Agency, **108,417** migrants and refugees had entered Europe by sea by 2 December 2018. In 2017, there were **165,372** arrivals in Europe, and **258,036** came in 2016. <https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-reach-61517-2018-deaths-reach-1524>

For more stats on migrant flows to Europe: <http://migration.iom.int/europe/>

An opportunity to explore the impact of a development programme on migration arose in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in 2017, when UNIDO completed a programme it implemented in cooperation with the Government of KRI between December 2016 and June 2018. The UNIDO programme aimed to generate employment and improve food security of both displaced persons

Figure 1 Main arrival states



and the members of the host population in and around Erbil.⁴ The programme implemented a market-oriented approach that focused on small and medium enterprise (SME) promotion, improvement of the value chain, and partnership development with the private sector.⁵ The project deliberately targeted both displaced persons and host community members, in response to widespread calls in the livelihoods literature to support not only refugees but also the economically struggling host population.⁶ UNIDO commissioned a research study towards the end of the project to learn about the migration plans of refugees, IDPs and hosts and whether participation in the programme may have influenced those plans. This paper analyses their responses and explores whether and how livelihood programmes like UNIDO's can better understand drivers of migration and how such programmes affect migratory patterns and trends.

⁴ UNIDO has implemented projects in different countries to promote the socioeconomic stabilization of regions and people affected by displacement [see Annex 2: UNIDO Programmes].

⁵ UNIDO project document 160047.

⁶ See, for example, Alenikoff, T. A. (2015). From Dependence to Self-Reliance. Changing the Paradigm in Protracted Refugee Situations. Policy Brief, Migration Policy Institute, Jacobsen, K. and S. Fratzke (2016). Building Livelihood Opportunities for Refugee Populations: Lessons from Past Practice. TransAtlantic Council on Migration and Migration Policy Institute. Washington D.C, Zetter, R. and H. Ruaudel (2016). Refugees' Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment. KNOMAD Working Paper. World Bank Group, *ibid*.

1 Displacement and the KRI's economy

By October 2018, the KRI had received virtually all (99 per cent) of the 250,184 Syrian refugees in Iraq; half of them, namely 126,226, are in Erbil.⁷ There are some 2.89 million IDPs in Iraq (over 4 million IDPs have returned home), and the KRI hosts about one-third of these IDPs.⁸

When the influx of Syrian refugees began in 2013, the KRI was relatively politically and economically stable. The situation changed in 2014 with the Islamic State's violent entry into Iraq and subsequent control of much of western and northern Iraq, including the second largest city, Mosul, unleashing a severe displacement crisis and a major economic downturn.

The 30 per cent increase since 2014 in population from the influx of displaced persons has strained the provision of public services and put severe pressure on the KRI's labour market. The ongoing conflict in Iraq has disrupted trade routes and negatively influenced the economic outlook for the entire country, including the KRI, and foreign investment has decreased.⁹ In addition, financial transfers to the KRI from Iraq's central government have become sporadic since 2014, as a result of ongoing budget disputes over oil sales and the international drop in oil prices.¹⁰

These challenges have affected the KRI's economy, which is highly centralized around Government spending, from businesses to household income and consumption. Public employees, who make up about half of the KRI's labour force, did not receive regular payment of their salaries from 2014-15. Pensions, allowances and public contractor payments also slowed during this period. The ripple effects of this lack of income for a large part of the population were widely felt, particularly as the private sector is weak and underdeveloped and unable to provide alternative employment opportunities or weather these budget constraints.¹¹

⁷ 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2017 – 2018 in response to the Syria Crisis, "Iraq: Syrian Refugee stats and locations", 30 September 2018, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/66319>

⁸ UNOCHA. "Iraq: Internally displaced people by governorate (as of 31 August 2018)." https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/iraq_idps_and_returnees_by_governorate_dtm-iom_round_102_aug31_2018.pdf

⁹ UNHCR (2016). Displacement as challenge and opportunity - Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community, Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. [EN/AR/KU].

¹⁰ Prior to 2014, the KRI's funds came from the federal budget in Baghdad. These transfers ceased in 2014 in response to the Kurdistan Regional Government's attempt to sell oil independently. In the absence of a renegotiated revenue-sharing agreement, the KRG has irregularly received funds from Baghdad. Since there is no adequate taxation system in Iraq or the KRI to complement public revenues, the KRG has been almost fully dependent on its own oil exports to cover costs. These revenues decreased after international oil prices dropped by 70 per cent in mid-2014.

¹¹ UNHCR (2016). Displacement as challenge and opportunity - Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community, Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. [EN/AR/KU].

2 Research questions

Given the number of displaced people in the KRI and the Region's weakened economy, we examine the UNIDO programme that was implemented in Erbil to explore whether and how strengthening economic/livelihood opportunities for people in migration-prone areas affects out-migration.¹² The case of Erbil provides the opportunity to compare the migration perspectives of two groups: the relatively stable Erbil host population, and those who have been displaced at least once (Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs).

We reviewed the migration plans of three groups of respondents (host community members, refugees and IDPs), asking whether refugees and IDPs planned to return to their homes (in Syria or other areas in Iraq) or whether they planned to migrate elsewhere, and why or why not.

2.1 Methods

The UNIDO project was not designed to influence migration, but provided an opportunity to explore whether livelihood support affects the migration decisions of refugees, IDPs and local population.

The research study used a combination of quantitative (surveys) and qualitative methods. The survey (N=296) targeted three groups (hosts, IDPs and refugees). Each group included those who had participated in the UNIDO programmes and a small control group who had not participated in it. In addition to the survey, we conducted 18 qualitative in-depth interviews with selected survey respondents, and five key informant interviews with UNIDO staff. For a detailed explanation of the methods used, see the Annex.

2.2 Survey

The survey team was led by a male US national field coordinator and included three enumerators (all ethnically Kurdish, two Iraqi males and one Syrian female) as well as a research assistant (Kurdish Iraqi female). The survey consisted of 33 questions covering demographics, UNIDO's programme, self-reliance and income, and migration decision-making. Each survey interview took about 20 minutes to complete. The interviewee was either the individual who had participated in the UNIDO programme or someone who had been recruited by the participant to be interviewed as an individual from the non-participant group. We did not ask whether the interviewee was the head of the household.

¹² A comprehensive assessment of the entire programme—preferably in the form of a panel study—is necessary to conclusively answer this question.

2.2.1 Sampling plan

We sampled from UNIDO's list of 722 beneficiaries, which consisted of 207 IDPs¹³ (29 per cent); 211 refugees (29 per cent) and 284 (39 per cent) host community members.¹⁴ Given our limited time and resources, the goal was to survey 200 beneficiaries (refugees, IDPs, and hosts) and 100 non-beneficiaries with similar demographic characteristics to have a control group. Sampling was purposive to cover the locations where UNIDO's programme was implemented: Baharka (n=20), Bardarash (n=27), Basirma (n=19), Darashakran (n=38), Erbil (n=55), Shaqlawa (n=137).

We conducted 296 survey interviews: 81 were members of the host population (27 per cent), 55 were IDPs (18 per cent) and 160 were refugees (54 per cent). Of the survey respondents, 164 had participated in the UNIDO programme, and 132 had not (the control group). Control and project participant samples had similar traits in terms of age, gender and location.

2.3 Qualitative research

We conducted 23 in-depth interviews with selected key informants (5) and programme participants (18). The field research phase (data collection) was conducted between 1 and 18 July 2018.

3 Findings: Migration from Erbil: hosts, refugees and IDPs

We discussed the migration plans of three groups of respondents, namely host community members, refugees and IDPs, to find out whether refugees and IDPs planned to return home (Syria or their hometowns in Iraq) or migrate elsewhere, and discussed the reasons for their decision with them. More than half of the respondents did not plan to migrate to Europe, but significant differences were evident with regard to displacement status. No major variation in responses was evident between UNIDO programme participants and non-participants: about one-third of all respondents stated that they were planning to migrate in the next six months. There was also no significant variation in level of education or sex.

¹³ Initially, there were 227 IDPs in the programme, but 20 had left the Erbil area by the time the study was carried out.

¹⁴ We report all percentages to the nearest whole percentage, so percentages may not add up exactly to 100 per cent.

3.1 Plans for migration

The majority of respondents in each group of our sample (refugees, hosts, and IDPs) did **not** plan to migrate within the next six months. As shown in Table 1, one-third (n=97) of the 286 survey respondents stated that they planned to migrate, and two-thirds (174) did not.¹⁵ Five per cent (15) said they did not know.¹⁶

Responses were strongly correlated with displacement status. Only 16 per cent of the 77 respondents from the host population and 26 per cent of the 54 IDPs claimed that they planned to migrate compared with 46 per cent of the 155 refugees. It is worth noting that among the three categories of respondents, migration intention is highest among refugees. Because they are not originally from Iraq and have already moved from their countries of origin, they seem to be more open to the idea of further migration compared to displaced persons within Iraq.


Table 1 Do you or anyone in your family plan to leave Kurdistan in the next six months?

	Yes		No		Don't Know/ Refuse Answer		Total	
Host (n=77)	16%	12	84%	65	0%	0	27%	77
Refugees (n=155)	46%	71	46%	71	8%	13	54%	155
IDPs (n=54)	26%	14	70%	38	4%	2	19%	54
Total	34%	97	61%	174	5%	15	100%	286

¹⁵ For all figures from the survey data, the total N will vary from question to question because not all respondents answered every question. They were allowed to skip questions or answer “I don’t know.” The total and percentages only include those who answered the question.

¹⁶ The question was: “Do you or anyone in your family plan to leave Kurdistan in the next six months?”

Figure 2 Do you or anyone in your family plan to leave Kurdistan in the next six months?



3.2 Where did those who left want to actually go?

To explore potential destinations, we first asked those who had replied ‘yes’ to (Q30) “Who will go?” (Q32), and then asked (Q33) “Where do they plan to go?” We further investigated the respondents’ target destinations in our qualitative interviews.

3.2.1 Return home

We did not ask the respondents directly whether they planned to return home (either within Iraq for IDPs or to Syria for refugees), but instead asked where they planned to go (Q33) if they had stated that they wanted to leave Kurdistan. Only three refugee respondents planned to return to Syria. Two others stated that they would go “anywhere” except for Syria. When asked in the qualitative interview why they were not planning to return home, the refugees and IDPs stated insecurity or the destruction of their former homes and property as reasons preventing them from returning.

One male refugee summed up the commonly stated reasons for not returning to Syria:


I don’t want to return to Syria because the security situation is very bad; there are many unknown armed groups who [...] have their own checkpoints [where] they stop people and take their money and belongings [...]. There is also the military recruitment problem. If I go back to Syria, I will have to join Bashar’s army and serve in the military. Nowadays you cannot leave the army even if you finish 2 years of service; you will have to stay in the army until the end of the war.

He then, however, added: “But in the end, Syria is our homeland and we will have to return there one day. But I don’t know when and how.”¹⁷ Among Syrian refugees, 95 per cent still had family in Syria, with 55 per cent being in communication with them weekly or more often. Some mentioned that they had family members keeping watch over their land in Syria.

3.2.2 Europe or America?

Figure 3 shows that Germany was the most popular destination country, with 20 respondents planning to migrate there (15 refugees, 3 host community members and 2 IDPs). Canada ranked second, with 15 planning to move there (1 host community member and 14 refugees), and the UK was third (3 host community members and 8 refugees). Only two mentioned the United States as their first choice. Seventeen respondents—ten refugees and seven members of the host population—stated that any other country would do.

Figure 3 Where do they plan to go?



Of the 20 survey respondents who specifically stated that they wanted to migrate to Germany, 12 said that they had family living there. The same reason was given by those who wanted to migrate to Austria, Denmark and France. Other reasons why Germany was the respondents’ first choice included¹⁸ better job opportunities and a good future for their children; the fact that there was a large Syrian or Middle Eastern population in Germany, and that Germany was generally a “good place” and treated refugees fairly. By contrast, only one respondent said they had family

¹⁷ Lanja interview with I.V.F.

¹⁸ Survey response data.

in Canada. Other than re-joining family members, the reasons mentioned in favour of Canada were similar to those stated for Germany.¹⁹

Very few respondents formulated concrete plans to emigrate (e.g. accumulating savings, selling off possessions, contacting a smuggler). The respondents were either playing with ideas, exploring routes on their smartphone or researching smugglers on social media, but their activities did not really have much substance.


3.3 Why people do and do not migrate: Drivers, attractors and inhibitors of migration

To further explore our respondents' attitudes towards migration, we asked the following questions:

- We asked those who stated that they did not have plans to move “*Why do you not plan to move?*” to determine some of the inhibitors of migration.
- We asked those who planned to move and had a target destination “*Why this place specifically?*” to obtain information on what attracted people to particular places.
- Finally, we asked all respondents “*If you were to migrate sometime in the future, what factors would cause you to move?*” to explore the drivers of migration (responses to this question are presented in Figure 4).

¹⁹ Survey response data.

Figure 4 If you were to migrate sometime in the future, what factors would cause you to move?



We organized the responses into three categories, namely attractors, drivers and inhibitors (Table 2).²⁰

²⁰ These themes draw on those identified in Turkey by Bellamy, C., S.Haysom, C. Wake and V. Barbelet (2017). The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees. A study of refugee perspectives and their institutional environment in Turkey and Jordan. Humanitarian Policy Group. ODI. London.

Table 2 Attractors, drivers and inhibitors of migration

Attractors (Factors drawing people to destination country)	Drivers (Factors encouraging people to leave their current location)	Inhibitors (Factors encouraging people to stay in their current location)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Positive beliefs/views about life “over there” - Access to services, jobs - Good treatment of refugees - Presence of family, community, network (“people like us”) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Weak/unstable economic/financial situation - Security situation - Lack of services (health, education) - Lack of fairness or justice 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Work opportunities - Family responsibilities - Costs and risks of travel - “Home sweet home” - Negative beliefs/views about life “over there” - Security situation in destination (for returnees)

3.3.1 Inhibitors: Costs and risks

The cost of illegal migration (i.e. the price charged by human smugglers) along with the high risk involved are well documented and powerful inhibitors, particularly for Syrians and Iraqis residing in transit countries like Turkey and Jordan.²¹ Just under half of the 174 respondents who stated that they were not planning on migrating (78 or 45 per cent) asserted that the reasons were the high costs and risks associated with illegal migration. Of the 97 respondents who said they planned to migrate, three-quarters (77 per cent) mentioned that the costs and risks of illegal migration were the main reason why they had not planned to leave that same year. In another question, nearly 60 per cent of respondents (174) claimed that the costs of illegal migration prevented them from moving.²² More than half of the respondents (59) did not want to use human smugglers because they are too expensive (upwards of USD 10,000) and the associated risks are too high.

One respondent said he would use a smuggler if he had enough money, but eight said they would never use a smuggler purely on legal or moral grounds. In our qualitative interviews, many host community members and refugees expressed strong opposition to migrating illegally. The views of this male refugee were frequently repeated by others:

²¹ Ibid. See also Carling, J. and F. Collins (2018). "Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(6): 909-926. Kuschminder, K. (2018). Deciding Which Road to Take Insights into How Migrants and Refugees in Greece Plan Onward Movement. *Issue Brief No.10*. Washington D.C., Migration Policy Institute. UNHCR (2017). From a Refugee Perspective: Discourse of Arabic speaking and Afghan refugees and migrants on social media from March to December 2016.

²² Q36, “What would prevent you from moving?”

My cousin is living in Canada and my sister in France. They both travelled legally through NGOs. [...] They didn't need to sell anything [...] because they travelled legally. I myself will never travel through a network of smugglers, even if it costs only \$200. It is very dangerous.²³

Many respondents from the host community reflected this factory owner's views:

I will never ever travel through illegal means or a network of smugglers [...] I believe only those people who are completely desperate and hopeless in life choose smuggling.²⁴

3.3.2 *Drivers: Economic/financial situation in Erbil (livelihoods)*

Lack of stable employment and a weak economic situation are widely reported as major drivers in migration²⁵ and the situation of the respondents from Erbil is no exception.²⁶ Lack of job opportunities and economic stability were major drivers of the respondents' desire to migrate. When asked "What would cause you to move in the future?", the response "lack of economic stability" was mentioned as the primary reason by 124 respondents, i.e. by nearly half. Of those who had stated that they planned to migrate, almost two-thirds (61 per cent) said this was due to the lack of job opportunities and economic stability in Kurdistan. Another 22 per cent mentioned lack of education for themselves or their family.

The economic situation of refugees seems to affect their plans to migrate differently than that of members of the host population and IDPs. We asked the respondents about their current employment and whether their family's economic situation had improved or worsened over the past year (Table 3).

- **Currently unemployed:** Of the refugee respondents, 92 of 158 reported that they were currently unemployed, yet around half of them (42, or 45 per cent) said that they planned to migrate; half of them (40, or 43 per cent) said they did not plan to migrate. Unemployment does not seem to be a solid indicator for planning to migrate, because while some unemployed refugees may *want* to migrate, they do not have the necessary resources to do so and therefore do not plan to migrate. Then again others plan to

²³ Lanja, I.Y.J.

²⁴ Lanja A.M.I.

²⁵ Browne, E. (2016). Drivers of irregular migration in North Africa (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1271). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, Zetter, R. and H. Ruaudel (2016). Refugees' Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment. KNOMAD Working Paper. World Bank Group.; UNHCR (2016). Displacement as challenge and opportunity - Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community, Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. [EN/AR/KU].

²⁶ See, for example, Rudaw. (2017). "Migration of young people still a major challenge in Kurdistan". Online. Available at: <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/23022017>

migrate regardless of whether they are unemployed. Only few of the currently unemployed host community members (3 of 16) and IDPs (8 of 22) reported that they planned to migrate.

- **Worsened economic situation:** 110 of the refugee respondents stated that their family’s economic situation had worsened over the past year,²⁷ and of these, 56 (or about half) said they planned to migrate. By contrast, a much lower number of members of the host population (9 of 36) and IDPs (6 of 31), who said their situation had deteriorated, planned to migrate.

Economic stability and job opportunities were inhibitors of migration. Being employed or other livelihood opportunities in Erbil, such as completing their studies or participating in a future training course, were mentioned by all respondents as reasons why they did not plan to migrate.

Table 3 Economic indicators and migration

	REFUGEES		HOSTS		IDPS	
	Not planning to migrate	Planning to migrate	Not planning to migrate	Planning to migrate	Not planning to migrate	Planning to migrate
CURRENTLY UNEMPLOYED	n=92 42 (45%)	40 (43%)	n=16 13 (81%)	3 (19%)	n=22 14 (64%)	8 (36%)
FAMILY’S SITUATION WORSENERD IN PAST YEAR	n=110 47 (42%)	56 (51%)	n=36 27 (75%)	9 (25%)	n=31 23 (74%)	6 (19%)

3.3.3 *Attractors: Beliefs about Europe as a destination*

The prospect of migrating to Europe is a goal for many, but the respondents participating in this study held varying views about Europe – its values, lifestyle and treatment of refugees. Their views were based both on feedback from family members or friends who had recently migrated to Europe and on popular media.²⁸ The respondents’ views about Europe acted as an attractor for some and a disincentive for others, while still others were ambivalent and represented both views. Whether people’s views about Europe were decisive in their decision to migrate or stay is unknown; we have no evidence for this.

²⁷ Survey Q.25: Compared with one year ago, has your family's income become better, worse, or stayed the same?

²⁸ UNHCR (2017). From a Refugee Perspective: Discourse of Arabic speaking and Afghan refugees and migrants on social media from March to December 2016. Carling, J. and F. Collins (2018). "Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(6): 909-926.

One belief expressed by refugees in the in-depth interviews was that a better future awaited their children in Europe.²⁹ Several parents wanted to migrate because they wanted healthcare and education for themselves and their children. One male refugee stated that he would move to Europe if he had the necessary money because the schools there were much better, that his family would be safe, and that he might be able to find work. These beliefs were based on his brother's experience, who was smuggled into Sweden, and many friends living in Europe who reassured him that everything would be easier once he made it to Europe, including access to education for his children and to other services.³⁰ Another male refugee compared the situation of his children, who had recently dropped out of school, to the situation he believed prevailed in Europe, although he had not personally been told such stories.³¹

On the other hand, some respondents expressed unease about what Europe might hold for them. One refugee stated that he preferred to stay in Erbil because his life there was informal and simple compared to life in Europe, which he imagined would be highly “programmed”, bureaucratized and more stressful.³² Many respondents were aware of the situation of their friends and family living in Europe and with whom they were in constant contact. A confectionary factory owner of the host population said:

I believe that those living in Europe or abroad are having problems and facing hardships. It is not always good for all of them. Many suffer from not having legal residency or the right and permission to live there. Many people complain about this issue. But there are also some people who are embarrassed and ashamed to admit they are having problems in Europe or abroad. My friend [in England] never encourages me to travel abroad.³³

The goal to move to Europe exists among the respondents, but they are also cautious, and the news they receive from Europe is mixed.

3.3.4 *Attractors and inhibitors: Connection to family or “home”*

Family connections are powerful incentives that draw people to a new destination (Europe or Canada), back to their homelands (Syria or elsewhere in Iraq), or to stay where they are (in Erbil). We found that compared with the members of the host communities, the refugees and IDPs in our study were much more frequently in contact with immediate family members,

²⁹ See also recent literature on the role of children in migration decision-making (Bohra-Mishra & Massey 2011, DFID 2018, Fratzke & Salant 2018).

³⁰ Paul Miranda interview with O.H.

³¹ Paul Miranda interview with A.H.

³² Paul Miranda interview with I.T.

³³ Lanja interview with A.M.I.

extended family or friends in other countries (mostly European countries) (Table 4). Having family in Europe is not necessarily an attractor (only 6 per cent of those who stated that they planned to migrate explicitly mentioned family as the reason for their decision), but it does influence the choice of destination, because having family in the destination country means access to information about life in Europe as well as about the risks of the journey.

Table 4 Contact with people in other countries

	<i>In contact with anyone in other countries (100%)</i>	<i>In contact with immediate family in other countries (100%)</i>	<i>In contact with extended family in other countries (100%)</i>	<i>In contact with friends or others in other countries (100%)</i>
Refugees	122 (76%)	81 (51%)	32 (20%)	9 (6%)
IDPs	33 (60%)	10 (18%)	16 (29%)	7 (13%)
Hosts	36 (44%)	20 (25%)	14 (17%)	2 (2%)

Family obligations in the current place of residence (Erbil), including having sick family members to take care of or because parents have prohibited travel, are also inhibitors of migration, mentioned by five respondents (or 2 per cent). One male refugee said:

“I would like to travel with my wife, but my parents won’t allow me to travel and I also don’t have money. They prefer us to arrange our lives here in Kurdistan.”

He later added: “I don’t believe my life would be better in Europe, I prefer to be in Kurdistan for now.”³⁴

Another significant inhibitor—particularly for members of the host communities and IDPs—was their feeling of loyalty towards their country and viewing Erbil as “home sweet home.” Of the 174 respondents (61 per cent) who stated that they did not plan to migrate, one-quarter (43 or 24 per cent) said they loved their country or believed that the KRI was a better place (Table 5). For members of the host population, most of whom (84 per cent) wanted to remain in the KRI, only one-third said their decision was due to the lack of financial means to migrate. A preference to remain in the KRI was held by around half of the IDP respondents, although the other half stated that the only reason they did not leave the KRI was because they lacked the necessary funds or means to travel. Most of the IDPs and host community members said they chose to remain in the KRI because “this is my country,” or because they felt a sense of belonging.

³⁴ Lanja, I.Y.J.

Table 5 Q31 Why do you not plan to move?

	HOSTS (67)	REFUGEES (73)	IDPS (26)	ALL RESPONDENTS (166)
LIFE IS FINE HERE IN KRI/KRI IS BETTER/IT IS SAFE HERE	13	9	7	29
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY/WANT TO STAY WITH FAMILY	2	2	1	5
I LOVE MY COUNTRY / I BELONG HERE	14	0	0	14

**Not all respondents answered this question about why.*

The desire to stay was often expressed in terms of “home sweet home.” For example, one male from the host population stated that living in one’s own country is “the best thing,” despite the hardships faced, which he believed would eventually be overcome. He said living in your own country is much more desirable than living somewhere where you always feel like a stranger, and the only reason he would travel to Europe would be to acquire new farming skills before returning to Kurdistan.³⁵ Another host community member said, “for any person, his home and country are the best place for him.”³⁶ A female factory owner in Shaqlawa asserted:

I will never travel abroad, and all my family members have the same attitude towards traveling. My son is 20 years old and without a job, but still he rejects the idea of traveling abroad. We love our country and love living here... I believe that what I can do here in Kurdistan in life and work, I cannot do in Europe. Europe is a foreign country for me and I prefer my homeland to live and work no matter what.³⁷

3.4 Migration and industry development programmes like UNIDO’s

Despite their reluctance to migrate, the majority of respondents, especially the refugees, saw their situation as economically untenable with no future for their children. They were more desperate to improve their situation. When we asked what would help their families the most,³⁸ we expected more respondents to mention migration, but only one member of the host community (out of 79) and three IDPs (out of 55) mentioned moving abroad. A higher share of refugees—though still only 27 or 17 per cent—mentioned migrating.

³⁵ Paul Miranda interview with R.A.


³⁶ Paul Miranda interview with H.S.

³⁷ Lanja, G.M.M

³⁸ Q.26 asked, “What would be the most useful thing you could do to further improve your family's living situation?”

The majority of respondents sought a steady job or some way to support themselves and their families. When asked “What would be the most useful thing you could do to improve your family's living situation?” the most common response of all groups was finding a stable job (40 per cent of hosts, 58 per cent of IDPs, and 58 per cent of refugees). Other reasons mentioned included education or training (usually referring to a university degree), receiving start-up capital to establish a small business (often tech-related, or opening a corner store to sell a range of goods), or an increase in earnings in an existing job (usually described as the desire to move from a job in manual labour to a management or office-based position), as illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5 What would be the most useful thing you could do to further improve your family’s living situation? (Number of respondents)




The UNIDO programme specifically intended to strengthen people’s livelihoods and improve their ability to find a stable job (either through employment or by establishing a business). Would job stability affect the respondents’ migration behaviours? On the one hand, the majority of respondents did not want to migrate, but asserted that if they did migrate, it would be for reasons of economic instability. On the other hand, some—especially refugees—claim that they would migrate if they had the necessary funds to do so, meaning improved livelihoods and income would enable them to migrate by providing them with the funds they need for the journey. Livelihoods programmes might remove an incentive to migrate by improving economic stability, but they might also give participants the *opportunity* to migrate by providing them with the financial means to do so.

Job stability might diminish would-be migrants’ desire to actually migrate. We do not have data proving whether migrants would still want to migrate, if issues such as job stability and cost hurdles no longer play a role. They would still, however, face the inhibitor of being unable to travel legally and the risks associated with illegal migration. Whether having a livelihood and a higher income influences migrants’ decision to remain in the host country or whether they still want to migrate elsewhere as initially declared could be determined through a panel study at the earliest one year after the migrant has started working.

We compared the responses of those respondents who had participated in the UNIDO programme and those who had not. Just over half of the participants and non-participants said finding a stable job would help their families the most. Although the differences between the two groups is not particularly striking as shown in Figure 6, the participants of the UNIDO programme seemed more likely to remain in the KRI, while non-participants seemed more likely to leave the KRI within the next six months.

Figure 6 Do you or anyone in your family plan to leave Kurdistan in the next six months?



To assess the UNIDO programme’s impact on migrants’ decisions, we first need to determine whether the livelihoods of those who had participated in the programme had in fact improved. Our survey explored three indicators of improved livelihoods: 1) whether the participants were currently working or not; 2) whether those who were working were paid daily, weekly or monthly; and 3) whether they considered that their family’s situation had improved over the past year.

As shown in Table 7 and Figures 7 to 9, a slightly higher share of UNIDO programme participants reported more positively to these indicators compared with non-participants. Fewer programme participants were unemployed, more of them were paid on a monthly rather than on a daily basis, and slightly more thought their family’s situation was better over the past year.

Table 6 Indicators of livelihood improvement

	PARTICIPANTS (N=164)	NON- PARTICIPANTS (N=130)
CURRENTLY UNEMPLOYED	38%	53%
PAID MONTHLY (OF THOSE CURRENTLY WORKING, N=153)	43%	27%
FAMILY'S SITUATION IMPROVED OVER PAST YEAR	18%	13%

Figure 7 Are you working now or in the past week?




Figure 8 Compared with one year ago, is family's income better, worse or same?





Figure 9 Are you paid daily or monthly? (currently employed)



If the programme participants' situation had in fact improved, it could be expected that they would be less likely to plan to migrate; when asked "Do you or anyone in your family plan to leave Kurdistan in the next six months?", a slightly larger share of participants did not plan to leave (63 per cent) compared with non-participants (57 per cent).

These are intriguing findings – there are strong indications in our survey data, supported by our in-depth interviews, that having a job, some form of livelihood or an opportunity for education or training could add to the mix of factors that discourage migration.

4 Conclusion

One of the strongest findings emerging from our study is that while most people are *unable* to migrate due to lack of funds (a major and frequently expressed constraint), many are also *unwilling* to do so.³⁹ The source of this unwillingness differed for members of the host population and displaced people, with hosts more likely to express attachment to their homeland, and displaced people more likely to be inhibited by cost and risks. But both host community members and displaced persons expressed unwillingness to leave based on a mix of factors: reluctance to travel, especially illegally; concerns about whether life in Europe suits them; and, first and foremost, because they do not want to leave home (in the case of the

³⁹ These findings match those of other studies on refugee migration decision-making, particularly of Syrians and Iraqis in transit countries like Turkey and Jordan. See Bellamy, C., S.Haysom, C. Wake and V. Barbelet (2017). The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees. A study of refugee perspectives and their institutional environment in Turkey and Jordan. Humanitarian Policy Group. ODI. London. See also Carling, J. and F. Collins (2018). "Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44(6): 909-926. Kuschminder, K. (2018). Deciding Which Road to Take Insights into How Migrants and Refugees in Greece Plan Onward Movement. *Issue Brief No.10*. Washington D.C., Migration Policy Institute, . UNHCR (2017). From a Refugee Perspective: Discourse of Arabic speaking and Afghan refugees and migrants on social media from March to December 2016.

members of the host population, in particular) or because the place refugees and IDPs have reached provides some level of safety. Many people feel that the known is less risky than the big unknown. This attitude is, of course, shared by most people in the world, which explains why only 3 per cent of the global population permanently migrates. In 2017, only 3 per cent of the world's population were international migrants, i.e. 97 per cent of the global population live in their native countries.⁴⁰

Our sample size was insufficient to provide statistical power to our preliminary findings, but the survey can act as a baseline either for a future panel study (to track the respondents of our 2018 study), or for a follow-up study in a year to check whether there has been any change in the migration intentions of UNIDO programme participants in comparison to non-participants.

The Erbil context provides an opportunity to compare the migration perspectives of two important groups in a conflict setting: people who have never migrated (members of Erbil's host population) and those who have been displaced at least once (Syrian refugees and Iraqi IDPs). The migration perspectives of these groups are seriously under-studied issues and warrant further investigation.

⁴⁰ *UN International Migration Report 2017 and UNHCR Global Trends 2017*. World population figures from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/world-population-by-year/>

References

- Alenikoff, T. A. (2015). From Dependence to Self-Reliance. Changing the Paradigm in Protracted Refugee Situations. Policy Brief, Migration Policy Institute.
- Bellamy, C., S.Haysom, C. Wake and V. Barbelet (2017). The lives and livelihoods of Syrian refugees. A study of refugee perspectives and their institutional environment in Turkey and Jordan. Humanitarian Policy Group. ODI. London.
- Browne, E. (2016). Drivers of irregular migration in North Africa (GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1271). Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham.
- Carling, J. and F. Collins (2018). "Aspiration, desire and drivers of migration." Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(6): 909-926.
- Jacobsen, K. and S. Fratzke (2016). Building Livelihood Opportunities for Refugee Populations: Lessons from Past Practice. TransAtlantic Council on Migration and Migration Policy Institute. Washington D.C.
- Kuschminder, K. (2018). Deciding Which Road to Take Insights into How Migrants and Refugees in Greece Plan Onward Movement. Issue Brief No.10. Washington D.C., Migration Policy Institute, .
- Poros, M. (2011). Migrant Social Networks: Vehicles for Migration, Integration, and Development. Migration Policy Institute. Washington DC.
- Rudaw. (2017). "Migration of young people still a major challenge in Kurdistan." Online. Available at: <http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/23022017>
- UNHCR. (2018). "Iraq." Online. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Iraq%20Factsheet%20October%202018.pdf>
- UNHCR. (2018). "Syria Regional Refugee Response: Iraq: Erbil." Online. Available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/15>
- UNHCR (2017). From a Refugee Perspective: Discourse of Arabic speaking and Afghan refugees and migrants on social media from March to December 2016.
- UNHCR (2016). Displacement as challenge and opportunity - Urban profile: Refugees, internally displaced persons and host community, Erbil Governorate, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. [EN/AR/KU].
- UNIDO. "Creating Employment and Improving Food Security for Refugees, IDPs and Host Communities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Project No. 160047/160157."
- Zetter, R. and H. Ruaudel (2016). Refugees' Right to Work and Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment. KNOMAD Working Paper. World Bank Group.

Annex 1 Methods

Our study used a combination of survey (quantitative) and qualitative methods. The survey aimed for a sample of 300 respondents from three groups: host community members, IDPs and refugees. From each group, we selected a sample of those who had participated in the UNIDO programme and a small control group of those who had not. For the qualitative evaluation, we conducted 23 in-depth interviews with selected key informants (5) and programme participants (18). The field research phase (data collection) was conducted between 1 and 18 July 2018.

Survey

The survey team was led by a male US-national field coordinator and included three interviewers (all ethnically Kurdish, two Iraqi males and one Syrian female) and a research assistant (Kurdish Iraqi female). The study also included a logistics assistant (Iraqi male who was not really part of the research team per se, since his role was purely logistical). Our four interviewers were well-trained, educated, experienced and thoughtful. Only one was living in the communities we were studying.

The survey consisted of 33 questions: 7 demographic questions; 4 questions about UNIDO's programme; 13 questions on self-reliance and income; and 9 questions on migration decision-making. Each interview took about 20 minutes to complete. The interviewee was either the individual who had participated in the UNIDO programme, or, for the non-participant group, someone who had been recruited by the participant. We did not ask whether the respondent was the head of household.

Sampling plan

We sampled 722 beneficiaries from UNIDO's list, of which 207 were IDPs⁴¹ (29 per cent); 211 (29 per cent) were refugees and 284 (39 per cent) were members of the host population.⁴² Given our limited time and resources, our goal was to survey 200 beneficiaries (refugees, IDPs, and host community members) and 100 non-beneficiaries with similar demographic features to provide for a control group. Sampling was purposive, aimed at covering the sites where UNIDO programmes had been implemented: Baharka (n=20), Bardarash (n=27), Basirma (n=19), Darashakran (n=38), Erbil (n=55), Shaqlawa (n=137).

⁴¹ Originally, there were 227 IDPs in the programme, but 20 had left the Erbil area by the time we carried out the study.

⁴² We report all percentages to the nearest whole, i.e. percentages may not add up to exactly 100 per cent.

We completed 296 surveys, 81 with members from the host community (27 per cent), 55 IDPs (18 per cent) and 160 refugees (54 per cent). Of the survey respondents, 164 had received training from UNIDO, while 132 had not (the control group). The control and project participant samples had similar traits in terms of age, gender and location.

Qualitative research

In addition to the survey, we conducted 23 qualitative in-depth interviews with selected survey respondents, and five key informant interviews with UNIDO staff. In-depth interviews took 45 minutes each and were conducted by the field coordinator and the research assistant. These interviews were supplemented with field observation notes (the field coordinator's daily log) across six sites (Shaqlawah, Erbil city, Bardarash, Basirma camp, Darashakran, Baharka). In addition, we reviewed UNIDO's existing documentation on the project, regional reporting on economic and development trends, and academic literature on the nexus between development assistance and migration decision-making.

Analysis plan

We organized survey and interview responses into main research themes (see data analysis matrix below), triangulating our survey data and qualitative responses, and comparing our findings with those from the broader literature. Outlier (unusual) responses were noted as starting points for potential future research studies, but were excluded from our final report and this working paper.

Main RQ or issue	Topics	Tabulation plan (Questions in survey)	Qualitative interviews with participants	Qualitative interviews with key informants
Current+ future migration plans	<p>Who is currently planning to leave and what is their destination?</p> <p>Why do people want to go there?</p> <p>Who will go?</p>	<p>Q.30 Do you or anyone in your family plan to leave Kurdistan in the next six months?</p> <p>Q.32 Who will go (from your family), and where will they go?</p> <p>Q.34 Why this place specifically?</p>	<p>What are your plans for staying or leaving KRI in the next year?</p> <p>For displaced persons: Might you consider returning home?</p> <p>Why do you want to go to [the place named as destination]?</p> <p>What does the future look like for you?</p>	<p>What does out-migration look like here in KRI at present?</p>
Factors affecting migration		<p>Q.26 What would be the most useful thing you could do to further improve your family's living situation?</p> <p>Q.31 Why do you not plan to move? (If answer to Q#30 is No)</p> <p>Q.35 If you were to migrate in the future, what factors would cause you to move?</p> <p>Q. 36 What would prevent you from moving?</p>	<p>Why have you stayed here in Erbil and not joined your relatives in Europe?</p> <p>What might encourage you to leave here?</p>	<p>How has the economic situation in KRI changed over the past year?</p> <p>Why are people leaving? Why are people staying?</p> <p>What are the main drivers of migration? What about return migration?</p>

Limitations of the study design and data

Given time and resource constraints, it was not feasible to aim for a statistically representative dataset or randomized sample; instead, we opted for a small sample size and purposive sampling that provided valid data, even if it was not a representative sample.

Sampling frame

During the design phase of our sampling strategy, we encountered some inconsistencies on precisely how many people had participated in the UNIDO programme and where they were located. In attempting to contact respondents, we found that records of participants were not sufficiently detailed which meant our sampling framework was a “best estimate” (as expressed by one project staff member).

Our survey respondents were identified by UNIDO’s implementing partner IKNN, who called them a day in advance, and whoever showed up at the assigned meeting place the next day was interviewed. The number of persons showing up to be interviewed was high in most sites, possibly because they were compensated for participating.⁴³ Control group respondents were identified through referrals by programme participants based on our requests for certain demographic characteristics. This “convenience sample” for the control group was the best we could do given that we lacked a sampling framework for non-project participants.

Questionnaire validity

Although we repeatedly tested and revised the questionnaire during the survey team’s training, the range of responses in the questionnaire did not fully reflect the varied types of work done by respondents. Many of them worked a range of jobs, with different employers or were occasionally self-employed on a daily or weekly basis. We captured this variety of work experience in the qualitative interviews, which is reflected in our findings and analysis section.

Data collection

We faced significant time and travel/distance constraints during the survey data collection stage, resulting in some areas and populations (for example, the Qarakarman farmers) being underrepresented. During the survey design phase, we had difficulty prioritizing which areas to focus on, resulting in over-representation in Shaqlawa, and underrepresentation of other areas like Baradarash. The Balisan and Salaheden sites were not sampled at all. It was generally difficult to find a quiet, cool space to conduct the interviews. Respondents suffered from travel

⁴³ Each survey interviewee was given approximately USD 10 for their participation and to cover transportation costs to the interview sites.

fatigue and heat and often had to wait for long periods to be interviewed, creating problems for women who were taking care of children.

Bias and managing expectations

Three members of our research team were male, and two-thirds of survey respondents were male (63 per cent), reflecting the dominance of male participants in UNIDO's programme (60 per cent). This bias means that only a partial perspective of women's livelihoods is reflected in this report.

Some UNIDO staff members and at least one interviewer stated that respondents seemed to exaggerate their problems in the hope of receiving UN assistance. When this was the case, our interviewers sought to curb such expectations: before starting the interview, interviewers carefully explained that the study was meant to assess the UNIDO programme only and *not* to decide who would receive aid or benefit from a future programme. The interviewers also emphasized that the study was being conducted by academic researchers outside of UNIDO, and that respondents would not receive additional benefits by participating in the study. In the few cases in which respondents did ask about assistance at the end of the interview, they typically requested information that might assist with resettlement in Europe, not requests directly relevant to UNIDO.

The data collection was limited to a three-week window, giving only a snap shot of the situation. People's experiences with employment, their income and migration are highly dynamic and vary depending on the season. For example, demand for certain local products (like fruit leather) increases during the tourism season from September to October, resulting in increased income for those who sell such products primarily to tourists. Thus, the responses to our questions about average daily income are likely to change dramatically depending on season.

Despite budget and time limitations and the small sample size, our study provides some insights into the situation and perspectives of refugees, IDPs and locals currently living in the Erbil Governorate of the KRI. The study can also be used as a baseline for future studies.

Annex 2 - UNIDO programmes

The UNIDO programmes aim to strengthen agricultural value chains through “a market-oriented approach with a focus on small and medium enterprise (SME) promotion, improving value added products and partnership development with the private sector,”⁴⁴ as well as to “create employment and income opportunities, and improve food security of the Syrian refugees, Iraqi IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), returnees, and their host communities, which will lead to strengthening their self-reliance and promoting inclusive and sustainable industrial development of the region.”⁴⁵ Support for farming and agro-processing of confectionary products, sesame, tahini, durum wheat, bulger and honey were implemented through three primary interventions.

1. Training & technical support

- Entrepreneurship development training in work and life skills, marketing, production, technology and finance
- Training in food hygiene and safety
- Training in soft skills and job placement
- Training in harvesting, grading, solar drying, and packaging agricultural products for farmers
- Efforts to establish self-help groups and networks of individuals in the same or related supply chains
- Guidance on improving plant layouts.

2. Provision of equipment

- Small equipment
- Common service facilities
- Start-up equipment and raw materials.

⁴⁴ UNIDO specifications document “Creating Employment and Improving Food Security for Refugees, IDPs and Host Communities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Project No. 160047/160157.”

⁴⁵ UNIDO project document 160047.

3. Institutional capacity building

- Training of trainers for the above-mentioned skill sets
- Support in handling small equipment.

These interventions targeted farmers, bakers, small and medium-sized enterprise owners and workers, household and micro enterprise owners and workers, factory owners and workers, and those seeking employment. The final intervention sites were Baharka, Bardarash, Basirma, Darashakran, Greater Erbil, Salahaddin and Shaqlawa. The project focused “on women, particularly female-headed households,” and although the target minimum of 30 per cent female participation was achieved,⁴⁶ the final set of beneficiaries were primarily male (60 per cent).⁴⁷

⁴⁶ UNIDO project document 160157.

⁴⁷ UNIDO summary of trained beneficiaries’ dataset.



UNITED NATIONS
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION

Vienna International Centre · P.O. Box 300 9 · 1400 Vienna · Austria
Tel.: (+43-1) 26026-0 · E-mail: info@unido.org
www.unido.org